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When the people are weary of any one sort of Tax,
presently some Projector propounds another, and gets
himself Audience, by affirming he can propound a way
how all the Publick Charge may be born without the way
that is.1
Fundamental tax reform has once again moved to the
center of political discussions. Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., and House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay, R-Texas, have proposed replacing the income tax
with a national sales tax. Other radical tax reform pro-
posals like the flat tax and a cash flow tax have also been
introduced in Congress. Meanwhile, President Bush has
proposed a dramatic expansion of tax-exempt savings
accounts, which together with his proposed zero tax on
dividends represent major steps toward exempting all
income from capital from taxation, and has said he would
focus on the tax reform issue in his second term. Given
the results of the 2004 election, the wide support for some
kind of tax reform, and the broad unpopularity of the
existing income tax, more developments in the same vein
are likely in the near future.
For more than 30 years, the tax reform debate in the
United States has focused on whether the proper base for
taxation should be income or consumption. Arguments
based on both fairness and efficiency have been made in
favor of replacing the income tax with a consumption tax.
Counterarguments in favor of the income tax have also
been made, primarily on fairness grounds.
However, the debate is misplaced because of its focus
on the consumption tax as a replacement for the income
tax. In every other member country of the OECD, a
consumption tax — or a VAT — exists in addition to the
income tax. Each tax has its advantages and disadvan-
tages: The income tax is less regressive and better geared
to taxing the rich, while the VAT is easier to administer
and better geared to taxing the majority of the population
1Sir William Petty, A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions 60
(1679). The author would like to thank Alan Schenk for high-
lighting this wonderful example of déjà vu all over again; see
Alan Schenk, ‘‘Value Added Tax: Does This Consumption Tax
Have a Place in the Federal Tax System?’’ 7 Va. Tax Rev. 207
(1987).
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor
of Law at the University of Michigan.
In this article, Prof. Avi-Yonah argues that the legal
academic debate about fundamental tax reform from
1974 onward has been skewed by the assumption that
a consumption tax must replace the income tax. He
addresses three of the major issue in recent writings on
the income/consumption tax debate, and shows how
none of the arguments in favor of the consumption tax
are conclusive. Avi-Yonah also addresses the various
consumption tax proposals that have been made and
shows that they are all deficient in comparison with a
VAT, as well as failing to achieve the goals of an
income tax. Finally, he develops the proposal that the
United States should adopt a VAT in addition to the
existing income tax, and addresses some of its impli-
cations (for example, for the state and local sales tax).
He then distinguishes the proposal from one made by
Prof. Michael Graetz to substitute a VAT for the
income tax on middle-class taxpayers, and argues that
while the Graetz proposal is sensible, we cannot afford
it.
The author would like to thank David Bradford,
David Hasen, Kyle Logue, Charles McLure, Oliver
Oldman, and Alan Schenk for their helpful comments
on earlier versions of this article.





ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
who consume most of their income. The VAT is also less
prone to evasion, less dependent on cyclical economic
fluctuations, and less subject to the pressures of global-
ization and capital flight than the income tax. That is why
the VAT has been adopted in more than 100 countries as
an addition to the income tax.
The reason why a VAT is used in addition to the
income tax in every other OECD member country is
simple: The revenue is needed to support the social
insurance safety net for the elderly. As developed coun-
tries face the retirement of the baby boom generation,
even long-time opponents of the VAT like Japan, Canada,
and Australia have recently adopted it.
The United States faces the same problem: An un-
funded gap of $70 trillion between expected revenues
and projected outlays for Social Security and Medicare.
The gap leaves the United States with two options:
drastically cutting benefits for the baby boom generation,
or raising more revenue. Cutting benefits would threaten
the unraveling of the social compact between young and
old that has enabled this country to achieve a dramatic
reduction in poverty among the elderly in the last
generation, and would further increase the gap between
the haves and have-nots. To avoid that outcome, at some
point in the near future we will need to raise significant
revenues. This article argues that that a VAT enacted in
addition to (and not as a replacement of) the income tax is the
best option for raising those revenues.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly
surveys the legal academic debate about fundamental tax
reform from 1974 onward, and shows how that debate
has been skewed by the assumption that a consumption
tax must replace the income tax. Part II addresses three of
the major issues in recent writings on the income/
consumption tax debate, and shows how none of the
arguments in favor of the consumption tax are conclu-
sive. Part III addresses the various consumption tax
proposals that have been made and shows that they are
all deficient in comparison with a VAT, as well as failing
to achieve the goals of an income tax. Finally, Part IV
develops the proposal made above, that the United States
should adopt a VAT in addition to the existing income
tax, and addresses some of its implications (for example,
for the state and local sales tax). It then distinguishes the
proposal from one made by Prof. Michael Graetz to
substitute a VAT for the income tax on middle-income
taxpayers, and argues that while the Graetz proposal is
sensible, we cannot afford it.
I. Introduction: The Great Tax Base Debate
The U.S. individual income tax was enacted in 1913 to
replace existing consumption taxes (tariffs) on the
ground that they were regressive. Until World War II, it
was imposed mainly on upper-income taxpayers and
was imposed at low rates, compared with the current
individual income tax rates. Even after the war, with
rates soaring to 91 percent, the income tax enjoyed
considerable popularity as the fairest tax. However, be-
ginning with California’s tax revolt in the early 1970s, an
increasing barrage of criticism has been leveled at the
income tax on grounds of inefficiency and complexity. At
the same time, perceptions of the income tax’s fairness
have been undermined by the increasing use of sophis-
ticated tax shelters by the rich to reduce or eliminate their
income tax liability. While the Tax Reform Act of 1986
achieved considerable simplification of the income tax by
reducing its rates and expanding its base, subsequent
enactments (especially in the late 1990s) have eroded the
gains of the 1986 act and have once again prepared the
ground for the advocates of radical tax reform to press for
replacing the income tax with a consumption tax.
In the legal academic literature, the recent debate on
the appropriate tax base began with Prof. William An-
drews’s seminal 1974 article in the Harvard Law Review,
published just as the decline of the income tax was
beginning.2 Before Andrews, legal tax scholars assumed
that a consumption tax had to be regressive because it is
based on sales and therefore cannot take into account the
personal characteristics of the buyer. Andrews, building
on earlier economics literature (for example, by Nicholas
Kaldor), showed that in principle it is possible to achieve
a consumption tax with a progressive rate structure built
in. He did this by showing that on the basis of certain
assumptions (to be explored below), allowing taxpayers
to deduct all of their savings and applying graduated
rates to them when they consume those savings is
equivalent to not taxing the income from those savings at
all. Thus, under the Haig-Simons definition of income as
consumption plus the increase in savings, exempting the
income from savings is equivalent to only taxing con-
sumption.
Prof. Alvin Warren replied to Andrews by arguing that
a cash flow consumption tax, as proposed by Andrews, is
equivalent to an exemption of the returns to saving, and
therefore only labor income would be taxed, which he
considered unfair.3 Prof. Barbara Fried added that the
supposed unfairness of taxing income ‘‘twice’’ (once
when earned and again when it produces interest) is
illusory, since it depends on using subjective utility rather
than wealth as a measure of income.4
In the voluminous literature that followed, proponents
of the consumption tax have advanced three main argu-
ments in its favor.5 First, they argued that it promotes
efficiency by eliminating the deadweight loss from a tax
on saving. Second, they argued that a consumption tax
would boost national productivity by increasing national
savings. Third, they argued that the consumption tax is
considerably simpler than an income tax.6
Opponents of the consumption tax have replied that
the supposed efficiency gains of the consumption tax are
2See William D. Andrews, ‘‘A Consumption-Type or Cash
Flow Personal Income Tax,’’ 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1113 (1974).
3See Alvin C. Warren, ‘‘Fairness and a Consumption-Type or
Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,’’ 88 Harv. L. Rev. 931 (1975);
William D. Andrews, ‘‘Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A
Reply to Warren,’’ 88 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (1975).
4Barbara H. Fried, ‘‘Fairness and the Consumption Tax,’’ 44
Stan. L. Rev. 961 (1992).
5For these arguments see generally Joseph Pechman (ed.),
What Should be Taxed, Income or Expenditure? (1980).
6See, e.g., David F. Bradford, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform
(1984); David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax (1986);
David F. Bradford, ‘‘The Choice Between Income and Consump-
tion Taxes,’’ Tax Notes, Aug. 23, 1982, p. 715.
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exaggerated and depend crucially on imposing a one-
time tax on accumulated wealth at the time of the
transition from the income to the consumption tax, which
is politically highly unlikely to happen. Moreover, the
added incentive to save under a consumption tax de-
pends on the crucial assumption that people do not have
a set savings goal, because if they do, they would
decrease, rather than increase, their savings rate in re-
sponse to a reduction of tax on savings. Moreover, the
empirical evidence is ambiguous at best on whether tax
decreases boost savings. Finally, the administrative ad-
vantages of the consumption tax depend crucially on its
structure and may be lost if Congress builds in exemp-
tions like it did in the income tax.7
In recent years, the debate has shifted to three other
issues, which will be discussed more extensively below.
First, proponents of the consumption tax (beginning with
Profs. Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith in 1992 and
continuing more recently with Prof. David Weisbach)
have argued that the actual difference between it and the
income tax is minimal because neither can reach risky
returns, and risk-free returns on capital have historically
been very low.8 Second, Prof. Ed McCaffery has recently
emphasized another point of similarity between a cash
flow consumption tax and an income tax, in that they
both reach inframarginal returns (rents), and therefore
they can both be used to tax the rich, but the consump-
tion tax is fairer because it taxes people only when they
use their savings to enhance their lifestyle (and not when
they use them to smooth their lifetime income patterns).9
Finally, Prof. Dan Shaviro has recently argued that a
consumption tax can achieve the same degree of progres-
sivity as the income tax, even though it does not appear
to tax unconsumed income.10 Thus, proponents of the
consumption tax argue that because the difference be-
tween an income tax and a properly structured consump-
tion tax is minimal, but the consumption tax is adminis-
tratively simpler than the income tax, it should be
preferred.
One notable feature in this entire discussion is the
near-universal assumption that a consumption tax must
replace the income tax, rather than be imposed concur-
rently. And yet, every other OECD member country has
both a consumption tax (the VAT in its various guises)
and both a personal and a corporate income tax. Some
OECD members have only added the consumption tax
recently (Canada, Japan, Australia, Finland, and Switzer-
land are the most recent ones), but none have abolished
their existing income tax on doing so.11
The reason for this phenomenon is simple: The income
tax is needed to tax the rich. As I will argue below, no
consumption tax can tax unconsumed wealth, and un-
consumed wealth needs to be taxed in a democratic
polity to enable government to achieve some degree of
control over the economic, social, and political power of
the rich. Thus, both a personal income tax and a corpo-
rate income tax are necessary tools of regulation of
private power in a modern society.
However, the income tax by itself is not enough. It is
necessarily complex, and its revenue-raising potential is
inherently limited both by administrability concerns and
by the incentive effects of high tax rates. In addition, the
income tax is limited by tax competition and the increas-
ing ability of the rich (including large corporations) to
shift their capital to other countries with lower tax rates,
and its revenues are highly cyclical. Thus, to fund the
social safety net, the government needs another tax
instrument that can produce high levels of revenue at low
administrative costs, and that is less dependent on cycli-
cal shifts in economic activity. All over the world, in both
developed and developing countries, the VAT has proven
over the last 50 years to be ideally suited to this role. In
fact, the rise and spread of VAT in the period since 1960
was the most important tax policy development in the
20th century. As argued below, it is time for the United
States to follow the rest of the world and adopt a VAT in
addition to the corporate and personal income taxes.
II. Should the Income Tax Be Replaced?
In this part of the article, I address three recent
arguments in favor of replacing the income tax with a
consumption tax. Fundamentally, the arguments boil
down to one assertion: The consumption tax is not
meaningfully different from the income tax in terms of its
progressivity or ability to tax the rich. Therefore, not
much would be lost if the consumption tax is adopted,
and the relative administrative simplicity of the con-
sumption tax favors its adoption.
The three arguments in favor of equating the con-
sumption and the income tax are (a) that neither can
reach the returns on risky investments; (b) that both can
reach inframarginal returns; and (c) that both can achieve
identical progressivity. I will address each in turn. How-
ever, before turning to those arguments, it is necessary to
reexamine the fundamental rationale for having an in-
come tax in the first place.
A. Why Tax Income?
The individual income tax was adopted in 1913, when
the 16th Amendment empowered Congress to tax in-
comes and overturned the Supreme Court’s Pollock deci-
sion of 1895, which held a previous attempt to tax
7Joseph Pechman, ed., What Should Be Taxed: Income or
Expenditure? (Brookings Institute Press 1980).
8Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, ‘‘Is the Debate Be-
tween an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About
Risk? Does It Matter?’’ 47 Tax L. Rev. 377 (1992); David Weisbach,
‘‘The (Non-) Taxation of Risk,’’ 58 Tax L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
9Edward McCaffery, ‘‘The Fair Timing of Tax,’’ 102 Mich. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
10Daniel Shaviro, ‘‘Replacing the Income Tax With a Progres-
sive Consumption Tax,’’ Tax Notes, Apr. 5, 2004, p. 91.
11For an excellent discussion of the VAT in the U.S. context,
see Charles E. McLure, The Value Added Tax: Key to Deficit
Reduction (1987). See also Liam Ebril, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul
Bodin, and Victoria Summers, The Modern VAT (2001); Alan A.
Tait, Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems (1988);
Adrian Ogley, Principles of Value Added Tax (1998); Alan Schenk,
Value Added Tax: A Model Statute and Commentary (1989); Alan
Schenk and Oliver Oldman, Value Added Tax: A Comparative
Approach in Theory and Practice (2001).
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incomes unconstitutional as a direct tax lacking appor-
tionment. Before the 16th Amendment was adopted, the
federal government relied primarily on tariffs and excises
for revenues, which served to protect American industry
from competition and were imposed on consumption
goods.
The principal argument in favor of replacing the
consumption-based tariff system with a personal income
tax was that the tariffs were regressive. Because the poor
consume a higher percentage of their income than the
rich, a consumption tax is generally more regressive than
an income tax. Economic developments in the late 19th
and early 20th century significantly increased the gap
between rich and poor, and supporters of the income tax
(primarily from the more agricultural states in the South
and West) felt that the industrialists of the Northeast had
grown rich behind protective tariffs and should bear a
greater part of the burden of financing the government.
In addition, state personal property taxes had notoriously
failed to reach intangible types of property like stock and
bonds, further reducing the tax burden on the newly rich
railroad, steel, and oil magnates.
I have argued elsewhere that the principal reason for
taxing the rich today is similar to one of the major reasons
why the personal and corporate income taxes were
enacted in the early 20th century: Both were perceived as
having the potential of curbing excessive accumulations
of political, economic, and social power by the rich.12
There are two principal arguments why a liberal
democratic state should curb excessive accumulations of
private power. The first is the argument from democracy:
In a democracy, all power should ultimately be account-
able to the people. Private accumulations of power are by
definition unaccountable, because the holders of power
are neither elected by the people nor have their power
delegated from the people’s representatives. In fact, the
American Revolution was founded on the conception
that while people have natural, Lockean liberal rights to
their property, undue concentrations of private power
and wealth should be discouraged. That view found its
expression in the republican creed of civic humanism,
which emphasized public virtue as a balance to private
rights. A virtuous republic, the Founding Fathers be-
lieved, was to be free from concentrations of economic
power such as characterized England in the 18th century.
Therefore, from the beginning of the republic, federal and
state legislators used taxation to restrict privilege and to
‘‘affirm communal responsibilities, deepen citizenship,
and demonstrate the fiscal virtues of a republican citi-
zenry.’’ As Dennis Ventry has written, ‘‘[t]he ideal of civic
virtue created a unique form of ability-to-pay taxation
that was hostile to excess accumulation and to citizens
who asserted entitlement through birth. . . . Inherited
wealth, as well as gross concentrations of wealth (inher-
ited or not), characterized an aristocratic society, not a
free and virtuous republic.’’13 In the 20th century, the
same view was best expressed in the corporate context by
Berle, who wrote that in a democracy like the United
States ‘‘it becomes necessary to present a system (none
has been presented) of law or government, or both, by
which responsibility for control of national wealth and
income is so apportioned and enforced that the commu-
nity as a whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is properly
taken care of. Otherwise the economic power now mobi-
lized and massed under the corporate form . . . is simply
handed over, weakly, to the present administrators with a
pious wish that something nice will come of it all.’’14
The other principal argument against excessive pri-
vate power is based on a liberal conception of equality.
Michael Walzer has explained that when liberals talk
about equality, they are not concerned with ‘‘simple
equality,’’ that is, equalizing everyone’s initial means.15
Instead, they are advocating ‘‘complex equality,’’ by
which Walzer means that every social ‘‘sphere’’ should
have its own appropriate distributive principles and that
possession of goods relevant to one sphere should not
automatically translate into dominance in other spheres
as well. ‘‘In formal terms, complex equality means that
no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to one
social good can be undercut by his standing in some
other sphere, with regard to some other good.’’16 In our
capitalist society, money is the ‘‘dominant good,’’ and the
people who possess it are the most likely to accumulate
illegitimate power in other spheres, such as politics.
‘‘This dominant good is more or less systematically
converted into all sorts of other things — opportunities,
power, and reputation.’’17 Walzer goes on to explain the
insidious effects of money and why it needs to be curbed
by redistribution, including redistributive taxation:
Market imperialism requires another sort of redis-
tribution, which is not so much a matter of drawing
a line as of redrawing it. What is at issue now is the
dominance of money outside its sphere, the ability
of wealthy men and women to trade in indul-
gences, purchase state offices, corrupt the courts,
exercise political power . . . the exercise of power
belongs to the sphere of politics, while what goes
on in the market should at least approximate an
exchange between equals (a free exchange). . . .
When money carries with it the control, not of
things only but of people, too, it ceases to be a
private resource.18
Nor, as we have noted above, is the power of money
limited to direct political power:
12The following is based on Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Corpo-
rations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax,’’
90 Va. L. Rev. 1193 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Why
Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Progressive Taxation ’’(re-
view of Joel Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic
Consequences of Taxing the Rich, 2001), 111 Yale L.J. 1391 (2002).
13Dennis J. Ventry, ‘‘Equity Versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax
System in Historical Perspective,’’ in Tax Justice: The Ongoing
Debate (Thorndike and Ventry, eds., 2002), p. 28.
14A.A. Berle, ‘‘For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees,’’
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365, 1368 (1932).
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It would be a mistake to imagine, however, that
money has political effects only when it ‘‘talks’’ to
candidates and officials. . . . It also has political ef-
fects closer to home, in the market itself and in its
firms and enterprises. . . . Even within the adver-
sary relation of owners and workers, with unions
and grievance procedures in place, owners may still
exercise an illegitimate kind of power. They make
all sorts of decisions that severely constrain and
shape the lives of their employees (and their fellow
citizens, too). Might not the enormous capital in-
vestment represented by plants, furnaces, ma-
chines, and assembly lines be better regarded as a
political than an economic good? To say this
doesn’t mean that it can’t be shared among indi-
viduals in a variety of ways, but only that it
shouldn’t carry the conventional entailments of
ownership. Beyond a certain scale, the means of
production are not properly called commodities . . .
for they generate a kind of power that lifts them out
of the economic sphere.19
Walzer thus advocates taxation as one means of re-
stricting the market to its proper sphere (along with trade
unions and limiting property rights). But he also recog-
nizes the inherent limitations of all redistribution, be-
cause his aim is not to abolish the market:
All these redistributions redraw the line between
politics and economics, and they do so in ways that
strengthen the sphere of politics — the hand of
citizens, that is, not necessarily the power of the
state. . . . But however strong their hand, citizens
can’t just make any decisions they please. The
sphere of politics has its own boundaries. . . . Hence
redistribution can never produce simple equality,
not so long as money and commodities still exist,
and there is some legitimate social space within
which they can be exchanged.20
The personal income tax is one means by which the
state can regulate the accumulation of private power. As
I have argued elsewhere, the tax achieves that function in
two ways: by directly limiting the rate of private wealth
accumulation (the limiting function), and by providing
incentives and disincentives to particular activities by the
rich (the regulatory function). For reasons explained below,
both functions are necessary and related to each other, in
the same way that both a brake and a steering wheel are
necessary for driving a car.21
First, the limiting function: Imagine a 100 percent tax
imposed on profits. Over time, that tax would eliminate
all sources of the power of the rich, since it would force
them to use their existing resources to pay politicians and
employees, and it would remove any incentive to accu-
mulate further wealth. The power to tax is indeed
potentially the power to destroy.
But a 100 percent tax is inconceivable. Taxation faces
an inherent limit that was well expressed by Justice
Oliver Holmes when he stated that ‘‘the power to tax is
not the power to destroy while this court sits.’’ The
Constitution places limits on the power to tax, limits that
are implicit already in Dartmouth College: The public
sector may not use taxation to completely eliminate the
private one. This is both a matter of constitutional law (a
tax may be a taking if the rate exceeds any reasonable
estimate of the state’s contribution to private wealth
creation) and a matter of practicality: We do not want to
kill the goose that lays the golden eggs by imposing
taxation at rates that create huge deadweight losses to the
economy at large (the deadweight loss is approximately a
square function of the tax rate). The precise limit of
desirable taxation thus becomes the quintessential politi-
cal question of our time, to be refought every four years
at the ballot box.
Given that we cannot tax at 100 percent, what is the
effect on private power of a lower tax rate, such as the
current 35 percent? Even at that historically low rate, the
income tax does significantly slow down the accumula-
tion of private resources, which are the foundation of
private power. For example, imposing a tax at 35 percent
on assets invested at a 10 percent yield (compounded
annually) over 10 years results in approximately 27
percent less assets being available at the end of the period
than would be available in the absence of the tax. Thus,
taxation at lower rates can meaningfully restrict the
buildup of assets that forms the base of the power of the
rich, even when it does not destroy it. But since that
power would continue to exist and grow at any reason-
able rate of taxation, we also need the tax to perform a
regulatory function.
Second, the regulatory function: The use of assets by
the rich (that is, their use of its power) may be impacted
by the threat that the tax rate would be raised if it is
perceived that the assets are not used for the betterment
of society. That can be seen by the imposition of higher
effective rates on certain forms of behavior Congress
disapproved of, like bribes paid to foreign officials and
participation in international boycotts. In both cases,
empirical research has suggested the tax penalties had a
significant impact. More recently, the threat of increased
tax rates applied to U.S. corporations that moved their
nominal place of incorporation to Bermuda seems to
have sufficed to block one such ‘‘inversion’’ transaction
and stop other corporations from adopting the same
strategy. Thus, it seems that taxation even at rates much
less than 100 percent can suffice to regulate private
power. But the rates cannot be set too low, because then
the rich would not care sufficiently to avoid the tax. That
is why we need the limiting function (that is, set rates at
sufficiently high levels for management to notice) for the
regulatory function to work properly.
Finally, in addition to providing disincentives, the tax
can be used to provide incentives as well. For example,
investment incentives are provided as a way of bolstering
the economy. Another example is research and develop-
ment, which has been shown by economists to produce
significant positive externalities for society, which justify
the government in providing a subsidy via the tax code.
Now, it is of course true that the government could
19Id. at 121-122.
20Id. at 122-123.
21See Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Corporations, Society and the State,’’ supra
note 12 at 1246-1249.
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subsidize those functions directly, rather than use tax
expenditures, so this cannot strictly be an argument for
taxing the rich. However, that would require setting up
an IRS-like agency to monitor the use of the subsidies, so
that any simplification advantage from abolishing the
income tax is diminished. And once the income tax is in
place, it seems like an obvious and convenient vehicle to
deliver the desired subsidies at little additional cost.
Is the income tax the best vehicle for curbing excessive
private power accumulation? An obvious alternative
vehicle would be a direct wealth tax. However, in addi-
tion to concerns on its constitutionality, it is questionable
whether a wealth tax is administrable. Intangible forms
of property proved difficult to tax in the 19th century, and
are probably even harder to tax today, since the valuation
of nonpublicly traded property is a very difficult enter-
prise. In particular, the rise of financial derivatives makes
it hard even for sophisticated financial institutions to
value their assets for financial reporting purposes. In
addition, political experience since 1972 has shown that
the American people are very averse to paying taxes on
property, as indicated by the wave of property tax
limitations and the impending demise of even the estate
tax. Thus, the income tax remains the best way of
reaching the sources of power of the rich, assuming that
it can do so.
B. Risk: Is There a Meaningful Difference?
Can the income tax in fact tax the rich, or to put it
another way, can it tax income from capital? If it cannot,
then a strong argument can be made for replacing it with
a consumption tax on administrative grounds, because if
income from capital cannot be taxed, an income tax has
the same base as a consumption tax but is immensely
more complicated (for example, because it needs to
account for basis).
Beginning with Bankman and Griffith in 1992, a
significant body of legal literature has argued that the
difference between income and consumption taxes is
minimal, and therefore the consumption tax should be
preferred on administrative grounds. Most recently,
David Weisbach has argued that ‘‘a Haig-Simons tax is
basically the same as a consumption tax (which imposes
a zero tax on capital), and the debate between the two tax
bases is not particularly meaningful. The decision might
best be made on administrative grounds rather than on
deep philosophical arguments about the proper distribu-
tion of the tax burden.’’22
The argument relied on by Bankman, Griffith, and
Weisbach is based on an observation made by Domar and
Musgrave in 1944, and expanded by many economists
since then. Domar and Musgrave pointed out that if an
individual is subject to (say) a 50 percent income tax on
risky returns, he can eliminate that tax by increasing the
amount invested, because the government shares equally
in both his gains and his losses. Thus, suppose the
individual makes a bet of $100 with an equal chance of
winning and losing (for example, a coin flip). Before tax,
the individual would receive $100 if he wins and would
pay $100 if he loses. If the government imposes a 50
percent Haig-Simons income tax, the individual would
only receive $50 if he wins (since he pays $50 in tax to the
government) but would only lose $50 if he loses (since
the government would in effect pay him $50 by allowing
him to deduct the $100 loss at a 50 percent tax rate). But
if he could double the bet to $200, he would get $100 if he
wins and pay $100 if he loses, putting him in the same
position he was in if the tax was not imposed at all.
Bankman, Griffith, and Weisbach expand this propo-
sition to argue that a Haig-Simons income tax cannot be
imposed on risky returns. They then go on to demon-
strate that if the income tax can be imposed only on
risk-free returns, since those have historically been very
low (around 0.5 percent), the difference between an
income tax and a consumption tax is so minuscule that it
is not worth the argument.
Various commentators have recently taken issue with
this line of argument. Prof. Reed Shuldiner argues that
the model is misleading for several reasons.23 First, in the
case of investments rather than bets, grossing-up the
investment is not costless: it involves both transaction
costs and credit risk, since even rich individuals cannot
borrow at the risk-free rate of return. Second, he argues
that the risk-free rate used by Bankman and Griffith is too
low, because they used the period 1945-1972, in which
unexpected inflation was high; from 1972 to 1999 the
risk-free rate was 1.5 percent and from 1802 to 1997 it was
2.9 percent. Moreover, the term of the rate is important: It
should match the term of the investment, and the real
risk-free rate for 1972-1999 on 10-year investments was
3.3 percent. Thus, the difference between the income and
consumption tax, even on the assumptions underlying
the Domar-Musgrave model, is more significant than
previous commentators have assumed.
In addition, both Prof. Shuldiner and Prof. Larry
Zelenak point out that the key assumptions underlying
the model may not be accurate.24 First, individuals do not
always behave with the kind of perfect rationality as-
sumed by the Domar-Musgrave analysis. Second, we do
not have a Haig-Simons income tax, as assumed in the
model, because there are various loss limitations im-
posed by the income tax.
First, individual behavior: Various empirical studies
have attempted to examine whether individuals adjust
their portfolios in the ways required for the Domar-
Musgrave analysis to be correct. Weisbach surveys the
literature and concludes that ‘‘the empirical evidence is
insufficient to sway us one way or another.’’25 More
broadly, economists have studied generally how sensitive
the behavior of the rich is to taxes and concluded that, in
many cases, that sensitivity is surprisingly low. For
22Weisbach, supra note 8; see Bankman and Griffith, supra
note 8.
23Reed Shuldiner, Taxation of Risky Investments, unpublished
manuscript on file with author.
24Id.; Larry Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to
Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, unpublished manu-
script on file with author.
25Weisbach, supra note 8.
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example, in most of the empirical studies in Joel Slem-
rod’s book on taxation and the rich, the expected tax
avoidance behavior either did not materialize or was
lower than expected.26 There are many considerations
that influence individual behavior beyond taxes, and
transaction costs make a difference as well. Because the
consumption tax advocates are using the Domar-
Musgrave result to advocate a radical change in our tax
law, it seems to me that the burden should be on them to
show that the risky returns are in fact not reached by the
income tax, rather than (as Weisbach suggests) on the
advocates of the income tax to show that the Domar-
Musgrave model is incorrect.
Second, loss limitations: The existing income tax im-
poses various limitations on losses, such as the at-risk,
passive activity, and capital loss limitations. In addition,
it imposes graduated (progressive) tax rates, so that
losses can sometimes be deducted at different rates than
the rates applied to income. All of these limitations
violate the Domar-Musgrave assumptions and result in a
positive tax rate being imposed on the return to risk
under the existing income tax.
Various critics have rejected the argument on the
ground that it is hard to find a normative justification for
the particular pattern of taxing risk imposed by those
limitations, except perhaps for progressive rates. In ad-
dition, Weisbach argues that this issue is irrelevant be-
cause the debate is about comparing Haig-Simons taxa-
tion to a consumption tax, not about the current income
tax.
However, the key question in the debate is not
whether we do or do not have a perfect income tax. The
key issue is whether the existing income tax succeeds in
taxing the rich in ways that a real consumption tax would
not. A tax is just a means to an end, not an end by itself.
If the purpose of having an income tax like the one we
have is to tax the rich, as argued above, the key issue is
whether it succeeds in doing so.
There is abundant empirical evidence that the income
tax does in fact tax the rich. First, according to 2001 IRS
data, the top 1 percent of the U.S. population by adjusted
gross income paid 33.89 percent of federal personal
income tax, and the top 5 percent paid 53.25 percent (by
comparison, the bottom 50 percent of the AGI distribu-
tion paid less than 4 percent of total income taxes
collected). That is a significant increase from 1994 when
the top 1 percent of taxpayers only paid 28.7 percent of
federal personal income tax.27 In 2004, even after Presi-
dent Bush’s tax cuts, the top 1 percent still paid 32.3
percent of federal individual income taxes and the top 5
percent paid 53.7 percent.28 Because (as indicated below)
a very large portion of the income of the rich consists of
risky returns, it is hard to explain those patterns if risky
returns are in fact exempt from tax.
Second, it appears likely that those significant pay-
ments by the rich are in large part the result of taxing
risky returns to capital, not labor income or nonrisky
returns. There is a strong correlation between wealth and
the percentage of an investor’s portfolio allocated to risky
assets, so that it is likely that a significant portion of the
rich’s income derives from risky assets. Specifically, the
percentage of income from equity investments (divi-
dends and capital gains), which are the most common
type of risky asset, increases from 4 percent for taxpayers
with incomes of $100,000 or less, to 11.5 percent for
taxpayers with incomes from $100,000 to $500,000, 24.7
percent for incomes between $500,000 and $1 million,
37.6 percent for incomes between $1 and $10 million, and
an impressive 61.4 percent for taxpayers whose incomes
exceeds $10 million.29 Another indication that the income
tax does reach risky returns is that total revenues from
the federal personal income tax rose dramatically in the
Internet bubble of the late 1990s and fell dramatically as
the bubble burst in 2000. Most of that rise and fall is
attributable to realizations of risky assets in the bubble
years.
It is not entirely clear why the return to risky assets is
taxed under the existing income tax. A combination of
loss limitations and limitations on investor behavior
(such as transaction costs, credit risk, and myopia) may
explain the observed pattern. However, the key issue is
not why this result occurs but that it does, in fact, occur.
The burden should be on the advocates of radical tax
reform to show that the existing income tax (and not
some theoretical construct like Haig-Simons) fails to tax
the rich on risky returns. It is, after all, the existing
income tax that they seek to replace, not some ideal tax.
If they can show that the top 1 percent by AGI would
continue to bear over a third of the total burden of a
consumption tax, then the reform would be more accept-
able to those who believe in taxing the rich for the
reasons stated above (or any other reasons).
Moreover, it seems to me that this distribution of the
burden makes the existing income tax normatively attrac-
tive even if its particular rules operate in sometimes
erratic ways. Thus, I disagree with Profs. Deborah Schenk
and Larry Zelenak, who argue that the existing tax on
capital is too unpredictable to be normatively attractive.30
We should look at the tax burden and its meaning from
an aggregate, not from an individual perspective. A tax
that is as progressive in its overall outcome as the existing
income tax is worth defending even if its rules lead to
strange results in individual cases. The key issue is the
ultimate burden imposed on the rich, not the particular
rules of the tax (progressivity, loss limitations, and the
like).
Finally, a word of caution is in order. The risk argu-
ment advanced by Bankman, Griffith, and Weisbach
bears a lot of similarity to the argument used (for
example, by Weisbach) to justify the adoption of the
check-the-box rule in 1997 for classifying foreign entities
26See Joel Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic
Consequences of Taxing the Rich (2001).
27Joint Economic Committee, New IRS Data on Income and Tax
Shares (2001).
28Congressional Budget Office (2004).
29Tax Policy Center (2004).
30See Zelenak, supra note 24; Deborah H. Schenk, ‘‘Saving the
Income Tax With a Wealth Tax,’’ 53 Tax L. Rev. 423 (2000).
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as branches, partnerships, or corporations. Weisbach and
others argued that taxpayers can in fact achieve any
result they want under the existing classification rules, so
that it would save administrative costs to replace those
rules with a simple election.31 The results of that radical
reform were catastrophic: It turns out that a vastly higher
number of taxpayers made check-the-box elections and
used classification to avoid the international tax rules.
Apparently, there were significant transaction costs im-
posed under the pre-1997 regime that prevented taxpay-
ers from achieving like results. That episode should lead
us to be very cautious in relying on theoretical constructs
like the Domar-Musgrave model to advocate replacing
the income tax with a consumption tax because they are
‘‘just the same.’’ For whatever reasons, the current in-
come tax succeeds in taxing the rich. It is highly doubtful
that any consumption tax would achieve the same out-
come (although as we will see below, some are better
than others).
C. Rents: Prepaid vs. Postpaid Taxes
Much of the consumption tax literature relies on the
familiar Cary Brown theorem, which is studied in every
basic tax class. The Cary Brown theorem demonstrates
the theoretical equivalence, under certain assumptions,
of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes in exempting
the return to capital from tax. In a prepaid tax, the tax is
paid when the income is earned, just as in an income tax,
but investment returns are exempt from tax. In a postpaid
tax, a deduction is available for savings, so that income
that is saved is not taxed, but investment returns are
taxed when they are consumed.
To take a common example, suppose a taxpayer earns
$100 subject to a tax of 50 percent and can invest it in a
bond earning 10 percent per year. Under an income tax,
the $100 of earnings are subject to a tax of $50, and the
remaining $50 are invested in the bond, yielding $55 after
1 year; the $5 of interest is subject to income tax (Mill’s
‘‘double tax’’) leaving the taxpayer with only $52.5.
In a prepaid consumption tax, the $100 of income is
subject to tax of $50 when earned. The remaining $50 are
invested in the bond, but when the additional $5 of
interest is earned, they are exempt from tax, so that the
taxpayer is left with $55.
In a postpaid consumption tax, the $100 of income are
saved, and the resulting deduction eliminates the tax on
the $100, so that the taxpayer can invest the entire $100 in
the bond. However, when the bond is sold for $110 a year
later and the $110 are consumed, they are subject to tax at
50 percent, leaving the taxpayer with the same $55 as in
the previous example.
Hence, the Cary Brown theorem demonstrates that
pre- and postpaid consumption taxes are equivalent, and
both exempt the $5 return on the bond from tax. Since
income from capital is exempt, under the Haig-Simons
definition of income, both pre- and postpaid consump-
tion taxes are also theoretically equivalent to a direct tax
on consumption like the retail sales tax (RST).
The Cary Brown theorem makes two important as-
sumptions. The first is that tax rates do not change
between the time the income is saved and the time it is
consumed. If the tax rate changes, the equivalence of pre-
and postpaid consumption taxes does not hold, because
a prepaid tax applies the rate at the beginning of the year
and a postpaid tax applies the rate at the end of the year.
However, that assumption may not matter too much
because rates can either increase or decrease over time, so
that it is unclear which form of the tax is more beneficial
to the taxpayer.
The other assumption, however, has clear implica-
tions. That is the assumption that the taxpayer can invest
the savings from taking the tax deduction in a postpaid
tax at the same rate as the underlying investment. That
holds true when the investment is a commonly available
one like a bond, yielding what the economists call
marginal (normal) returns. However, suppose the under-
lying investment is in a unique business opportunity,
yielding what the economists call inframarginal (extraor-
dinary) returns, or rents. In that case, the investor may
not be able to invest the tax savings at the same rate as
the underlying investment because the size of the unique
investment opportunity is limited, and the Cary Brown
equivalence does not hold.
For example, suppose in the example above the un-
derlying investment yields a 50 percent return but the tax
savings can only be invested in a bond earning 10
percent. In a prepaid tax, the taxpayer earns $100, pays
$50 in tax, and invests the other $50 in the high-yielding
opportunity, resulting after a year in a $25 return that is
exempt from tax, for a net after-tax of $75. In a postpaid
tax, the investor earns $100 and does not pay tax because
of the deduction for savings; however, of the $100, only
$50 can be invested at a return of 50 percent, and the
other $50 (the tax savings) are invested at 10 percent. The
result is a yield after a year of $75 from the underlying
investment and $55 from the tax saving, for a total of
$130, and when those are consumed and are subject to tax
at 50 percent, the taxpayer nets only $65. To put it another
way, in a postpaid tax, only the normal yield is exempt
from tax; the extraordinary yield is fully taxable.
Ed McCaffery uses that result to argue for a postpaid
consumption tax.32 In his view, such a tax is superior to
an income tax because it does not tax the normal return
to savings, but it is also superior to a prepaid consump-
tion tax because it does reach extraordinary returns to
savings when they are consumed. Or to put it another
way, the tax is deferred when savings are used to smooth
income over a lifetime, but imposed when the savings are
consumed above the return necessary for that smoothing.
While I disagree with McCaffery about taxing uncon-
sumed earnings, for the reasons explained above (and
elaborated further below), I agree with him regarding the
superiority of postpaid over prepaid consumption taxes
because of their ability to reach rents. Rents should be
subject to high taxation in part because they are hard to
replicate (and thus the deadweight loss from taxing them
is small) and in part because they depend on luck (such
31See David Weisbach, ‘‘Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Effi-
ciency in the Tax Law,’’ 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1627 (1999). 32McCaffery, supra note 9.
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as the distribution of various talents). The key issue is
how common are those rents. There is abundant litera-
ture that suggests that rents are common for corpora-
tions, and that may be why most serious consumption
tax proposals (but not some of them) support a postpaid
(cash flow) consumption tax for corporations.
However, there is also evidence that in a ‘‘winner take
all’’ society, rents are commonly earned by individuals as
well. Consumption tax advocates sometimes argue that
those rents are a form of labor income, not income from
capital. Thus, the extraordinary returns earned by Bill
Gates or Warren Buffett presumably result from their skill
and luck and not primarily from capital invested (which
in the case of Gates was minimal). However, it seems to
me immaterial whether those rents earned by individuals
are capital or labor income. The key issue is to ensure that
they are taxed, and while the current income tax does not
do a very good job in taxing them (primarily due to the
realization requirement), it does a better job than a
prepaid consumption tax that exempts those rents alto-
gether. Whether a postpaid consumption tax can reach
them depends on whether they are in fact consumed,
which I will discuss below. For now, it is important to
remember that only postpaid consumption taxes can
reach rents, because that is a key issue in differentiating
among the various tax reform proposals currently ad-
vanced.
D. Can a Consumption Tax Be Progressive?
Many consumption tax advocates argue that a prop-
erly structured consumption tax can be just as progres-
sive as the income tax. The most promising candidate
from this perspective is a postpaid consumption tax,
because as we have seen it can impose progressive rates
on both labor income and on rents when those are
consumed. On the other hand, transactional consump-
tion taxes like the RST cannot generally be progressive
because they are imposed at a uniform rate and because
the poor consume a higher proportion of their income
than the rich. Nor can prepaid consumption taxes be as
progressive because they exempt rents even when those
are consumed.
The key issue regarding regressivity is whether any
consumption tax, even a postpaid one, can be as progres-
sive as an income tax given that it does not by definition
reach income that is not consumed. The super-rich do not
consume a significant portion of their income during
their lifetime, and an income tax can in principle tax
those earnings (or at least the risk-free portion of them)
whereas even a postpaid consumption tax does not.33
Dan Shaviro argues that that perception is mistaken
because a consumption tax will always tax income whose
consumption is deferred, even if it is deferred for a long
time. He gives an example of taxpayers A and B who both
consume $100,000 in a given year, but A has spent
everything she earned whereas B has saved $1 million in
the bank. Assuming a 50 percent consumption tax rate
and a 10 percent interest rate, A presumably earned
$200,000 and B earned $1.2 million, and each paid
$100,000 in tax. B’s remaining $1 million grows to $1.1
million and when it is consumed B pays $550,000 in tax.
Shaviro points out that this is the same additional
$500,000 in tax liability B would have had had she
consumed everything in year 1, increased by the interest
rate of 10 percent to take into account the one-year
deferral. Thus, A and B are in fact treated the same.
More generally, Shaviro argues that any income is only
worth what it can buy; ‘‘otherwise, it might as well be
play money from the board games Monopoly or Life.’’
Thus, it is wrong to argue that a consumption tax fails to
reach the indirect benefits of wealth-holding, such as
security, political power, or social standing; this non-
sequitur ‘‘appears to rest on money illusion, or the
mistaken belief that a dollar has inherent value, rather
than being worth what it can buy.’’34
However, the argument ignores the fact that money
can be used for other things than consumption. Most
importantly, it can be used to acquire investments — both
financial and real, such as manufacturing plants. And the
key point made above is that the power of the rich, which
is (in my view) the principal target of the income tax,
rests primarily on their ability to invest, not to consume.
For example, it is the ability of corporations to choose
which locations to open plants and create jobs that makes
politicians so solicitous of their welfare — more, in fact,
than their direct political contributions. But even in the
case of political contributions, it is unclear whether those
would be reached by a consumption tax, because it can
persuasively be argued that those are a form of invest-
ment rather than consumption. Thus, a consumption tax
would only reach the small percentage of the power of
the rich that depends directly on their ability to consume,
such as their personal employees or businesses that
provide consumer goods to them. It would not reach the
much larger percentage of their power that depends on
their ability to invest.
Theoretically, therefore, no consumption tax can
achieve the goals of progressivity, which I have argued
above are to curb the power of the rich, as well as an
income tax. That does not mean that the current income
tax does a very good job, although it appears from the
data cited above to be quite progressive. Perhaps a
consumption tax that taxes labor income at sharply
graduated rates and also reaches actual consumption of
saved income can be as progressive as the current income
tax.35 However, the burden should be on consumption
tax advocates to show that this is indeed the case; the
distributive tables of President Bush’s steps toward a
consumption tax suggest otherwise. In addition, the
income tax, because it reaches unconsumed income, can
be made more progressive in ways that a consumption
tax cannot, because it can reach the main source of the
power of the rich — their unconsumed wealth.
33Theoretically, leaving accumulated wealth to one’s heirs
can be defined as a form of consumption, but none of the
current consumption tax proposals do so.
34Shaviro, supra note 10.
35One should note, however, that the sharply graduated
rates of such a tax come at a price, namely increased pressure on
the labor/leisure tradeoff.
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III. What Kind of Consumption Tax?
There are three major proposals currently advanced
for replacing the income tax with a consumption tax.
They are: a proposal to enact a federal RST (a transac-
tional consumption tax), the flat tax and its variant the X
tax (prepaid consumption taxes), and the cash flow tax (a
postpaid consumption tax). I will discuss each in turn,
comparing each with the existing income tax and with a
VAT, and also consider some of the international impli-
cations of adopting those proposals.
A. A Federal RST
The RST proposal (for example, H.R. 25, introduced by
Rep. John Linder, R-Ga.) would abolish all federal taxes
and replace them with a uniform 23 percent RST to be
administered by the states. Unlike the state RSTs, how-
ever, the federal tax would apply to services as well as
goods, would apply only to final sales to consumers, and
would apply regardless of whether the selling entity has
a physical presence in the state in which the consumer
lives. Thus, the federal RST is designed to address the
major flaws of the current state RSTs (discussed in more
detail below): they generally apply only to goods, not to
services; they apply in many cases to business-to-
business transactions; and they cannot be collected on
sales by remote vendors (via catalogs or e-commerce).
Nevertheless, the federal RST proposal is badly
flawed. First, in comparison with the income tax, it is
highly regressive. As a transactional tax, it cannot take
into account the personal characteristics of the buyer or
have a progressive rate schedule. While it may be pos-
sible to build in exemptions for some necessities like food
or clothing, as the states do, the effect would make the tax
much more complicated, would require much higher
rates on the remaining items, and would still be regres-
sive. This proposal is a step back to 19th century federal
finance, based entirely on regressive tariffs and excises.
The result is acceptable only if one believes that ulti-
mately wealth is valuable only as deferred consumption,
which I have argued above is not the case.
Second, the tax is unadministrable. No country in the
world has tried, much less succeeded, to collect a single
stage sales tax with rates exceeding 20 percent. The
reason is that with only one point of collection, evasion
opportunities are rampant. Moreover, enforcement
would be entirely up to the states, some of whom do not
currently have an RST. It is likely that states would
compete with each other in lax enforcement, given that
the revenue would flow to the federal government (as
they do, for example, in Germany where the states collect
the federal VAT).
The VAT, in contrast, has a much better enforcement
record. Many countries, including developing countries
with weak tax administrations, have succeeded in collect-
ing VATs at rates well over 20 percent. The reason is that
in an invoice-credit VAT, the taxpayers are recruited to
and have an interest in helping the tax administration
collect the tax. An invoice-credit VAT works by collecting
tax at each intermediate transaction, as in the following
example assuming a 10 percent (tax-exclusive) VAT:
Manufacturer sells widget to wholesaler for $100, pays
tax of $10 (output tax).
Wholesaler sells widget to retailer for $200, pays tax of
$20, receives credit of $10 for tax paid by manufacturer
(input credit).
Retailer sells widget to consumer for $500, pays tax of
$50, receives credit of $20 for tax paid by wholesaler.
The net result is that the government imposes tax of
$80 ($10 + $20 + $50) but gives out credits of $30, for a net
collection of $50, just as if the tax was an RST imposed
only on the final sale from retailer to consumer. However,
because the tax is collected in three stages rather than in
one, the chances for evasion are much smaller: If the
wholesaler fails to pay the tax on the purchase from the
manufacturer, the retailer would not get a credit, and
therefore the retailer has an interest in ensuring that the
wholesaler pays his share of the tax. Similarly, if the
manufacturer does not pay tax, the wholesaler would not
get a credit. The only transaction to which this monitor-
ing does not apply is the final sale from the retailer to the
consumer, and indeed it is in that stage that evasion takes
place in a VAT. But the revenue at stake if evasion takes
place successfully is only $30, not the full $50, as in an
RST. In a VAT, there is an incentive to be ‘‘in the system’’
and not make exempt sales, since no input credits are
available for those sales.
If we are serious about abolishing the federal income
tax and replacing it with a transactional consumption tax,
the only plausible candidate would be a VAT, not an RST,
administered by the federal government, not by the
states. But that is not a plausible option given the
regressivity of the proposal.
B. The Flat Tax and the X Tax
These two proposals are quite similar but differ in one
important way: The flat tax (for example, H.R. 3060,
introduced by Rep. Nick Smith, R-Mich., and others), as
its name implies, has only one rate, while the X tax
(proposed by Prof. David Bradford) has progressive rates
on wage income.
In both cases, the tax includes a cash flow tax on
businesses, which is the same as a subtraction method
VAT except that wages are deductible.36 Thus, a business
deducts all expenses (including capital expenditures) and
includes all income from sales. Financial transactions are
ignored, so that interest is neither includable nor deduct-
ible, and margins go untaxed.
At the individual level, wages (including deferred
compensation in the form of retirement benefits) are
taxed as income either at a flat rate with an exemption or
at graduated rates. Interest, dividends, and capital gains
are not taxed. The combination is a consumption tax at
the business level because of the current deduction for
capital expenses (so that normal income from capital is
exempt under the Cary Brown theorem). At the indi-
vidual level, the tax is a prepaid consumption tax because
income from capital is exempt.
36A VAT can be collected either by the invoice-credit method
(described above and used primarily in Europe) or by the
subtraction method (used in Japan), in which a business in-
cludes all sales and deducts all purchases.
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In comparison with the income tax, the flat tax and X
tax may be acceptable at the business level, because only
the normal return to capital is exempt under the cash
flow tax (although that may have adverse international
implications, discussed below). However, at the indi-
vidual level, even rents are exempt, because (as explained
above) they are not reached by prepaid consumption
taxes. Thus, the tax is acceptable only if we believe that
the existing income tax fails to reach most returns to
capital and even returns to labor in the form of rents
(such as the returns of Bill Gates or Warren Buffett). As
argued above, the best evidence is that this is not true,
and therefore even the X tax with its progressive rates on
labor income would tax the rich less than the existing
income tax.
In comparison with a VAT, those proposals are defi-
cient for two reasons. First, they are less easy to admin-
ister at the business level than an invoice-credit VAT
because they require the administrative mechanism of an
income tax to police deductions. That is why the vast
majority of countries have opted for an invoice-credit
VAT. Second, because of the deduction for wages, the flat
tax and X tax do not qualify as an indirect tax for World
Trade Organization purposes. As a result, the rebate of
this tax embedded in export prices (if it could be calcu-
lated with precision) likely would constitute a prohibited
subsidy under the WTO rules. To comply with the WTO
rules they must be origin- rather than destination-based.
I will discuss the relative advantages of each system
below, but for now it suffices that origin-based taxes
suffer from the same transfer pricing issue as an income
tax. Under an origin-based tax, imports are deducted and
exports are included in the tax base, which means that
transfer pricing is a problem when either imports or
exports are from or to a related party. If the flat tax were
destination-based, on the other hand, exports would be
excluded from the base and imports would not be
deductible, so the problem would not arise. That is one
reason why every country that has adopted a VAT has
opted for the destination principle, which is also superior
for other reasons (explained below).
C. Cash Flow Taxes
A cash flow tax is the best form of consumption tax
proposal (for example, H.R. 269, introduced by Rep. Phil
English, R-Pa.). It includes a cash flow, destination-based
VAT at the business level, which exempts only the normal
return to capital. At the individual level, it is a postpaid
consumption tax, with a deduction allowed for savings
but all cash flows included in the base, and progressive
rates. Thus, rents are taxed for the reasons explained
above at both the business and individual levels.
In comparison with the income tax, the only problem
is the nontaxation of savings until they are consumed. As
argued above, that is a problem if one believes, as I do,
that the main purpose of an income tax is to curb the
power of the rich, and that power is expressed primarily
through investing unconsumed income.
In comparison with the VAT, the cash flow proposals
include a normal destination-based, consumption VAT at
the business level. The only issue is the choice of a
subtraction method rather than a credit invoice method
to make the tax resemble an income tax. I believe the
credit invoice method is superior from an administrative
perspective, but reasonable people can disagree on this
point.
D. International Implications
One of the major reasons to reject any tax reform that
replaces the income tax with a consumption tax is the
international implications of such a move. I have argued
elsewhere that a situation in which the United States does
not levy taxes on the normal return to capital, while the
rest of the world has a normal corporate income tax, is
untenable. It would result in massive shifts of capital to
the United States, the unraveling of the income tax treaty
network, and either the end of the income tax in other
countries (the better result, but one not likely to please
our trading partners) or a ‘‘tax war’’ in which those
countries try to capture the revenue we have foregone to
tax.37 None of those problems arise if the United States
adopts an invoice-credit, destination-based VAT in addi-
tion to the existing income and corporate taxes. In that
case, we would be following the rest of the world. The
lack of a VAT in the United States is a glaring anomaly in
our tax policy, and it is time for it to be corrected.
However, not everybody agrees with the critique of
the international aspects of consumption tax proposals
set out above. In his article ‘‘Ironing Out the Flat Tax,’’
Prof. David Weisbach mounts a trenchant critique of all
aspects of the flat tax proposal.38 All, that is, except one —
the international dimension. In its international aspects,
Weisbach writes, ‘‘most of the implementation issues . . .
are not that serious, which is important given that some
have claimed that these issues are significant.’’39 Because
the only person he cites as those ‘‘some’’ is myself, and
because his observations apply to all the consumption tax
proposals discussed above, I would like to take this
opportunity to respond to some of his critique.
The first point Weisbach raises as a potential issue is
transfer pricing. Because the flat tax is an origin-based
system, Weisbach acknowledges that transfer pricing
would be an issue, for the reasons stated above. How-
ever, he states, ‘‘[i]t is likely that the transfer pricing
regime in the Flat Tax would be similar to current law in
both scope and complexity.’’40 Therefore, it is not a reason
not to adopt the flat tax.
The argument is wrong for two reasons. First, because
the flat tax is territorial, transfer pricing applies to both
inbound transactions (sales by foreign corporations to
related domestic corporations) and outbound transac-
tions (sales by domestic corporations to related foreign
corporations). Our current system, however, is in prin-
ciple global, so that the transfer pricing issue applies
primarily to inbound transactions. For outbound trans-
actions, it is true (as Weisbach notes) that transfer pricing
is an issue under current law because we grant deferral to
37See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘From Income to Consumption
Tax: Some International Implications,’’ 33 San Diego L. Rev. 1329
(1996).
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most forms of active income earned by subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations. But crucially, we do not grant deferral
to those outbound transactions that raise the most impor-
tant transfer pricing concerns, that is, base company
transactions (in which goods are sold from the United
States to a tax haven subsidiary and then resold at a hefty
markup to non-tax haven subsidiaries or to consumers in
high-tax countries). Those rules were enacted in 1962 in
response to the Dupont case, which took the IRS 20 years
to litigate. Adopting a territorial system (either as part of
the flat tax or otherwise) would invite massive shifting of
profits to overseas subsidiaries in tax havens, which
would dwarf the significant shifting that takes place
currently. Thus, it is not accurate to say that ‘‘[a]t most,
more enforcement or a slightly stronger set of regulations
might be needed.’’41 A territorial system like the flat tax
would require much more transfer pricing enforcement
(as well as more enforcement of sourcing rules) than our
current system. In addition, our current regime could be
improved dramatically from that perspective by elimi-
nating deferral altogether, which would leave transfer
pricing as a problem only for inbound transactions.
Second, Weisbach is wrong here because he ignores
the existence of a much better alternative — the one
proposed below, namely a destination-based consump-
tion tax, like all current VATs. A destination-based tax
does not give rise to transfer pricing issues. Even David
Bradford, who otherwise favors the flat tax (or a variant
thereof, the X tax), has recently come out in favor of
modifying the origin-based system to address transfer
pricing concerns.42 In evaluating the flat tax, it should not
only be compared with the current income tax; it should
also be compared with other consumption tax alterna-
tives (like a VAT or the USA tax, both of which are
destination-based), as well as to possible reforms of the
income tax (like abolishing deferral).
The second point Weisbach raises concerns whether
the flat tax would be creditable under income tax treaties.
I have argued that it likely would not be because it is a
consumption tax, and because the IRS has ruled that a
similar cash flow tax proposed by Bolivia was not
creditable. Weisbach disagrees, but he also does not
believe the creditability of the flat tax is a ‘‘very serious’’
issue. For marginal (risk-free) returns to capital, he ar-
gues, noncreditability is not an issue because on a present
value basis the flat tax rate is zero, so the fact that other
countries may not credit it is irrelevant. For inframarginal
(above normal) returns, he argues that if they are specific
to the United States, the foreign investor has to be in the
United States in any case, and therefore the lack of a
credit would not affect the decision where to invest.
Thus, the issue arises only if there are inframarginal
returns not specific to the United States, and that ‘‘is
unlikely to be a large category.’’43
Weisbach is clearly right to say that to the extent the
flat tax imposes a zero rate on marginal returns to capital
income, the fact that it is not creditable should not matter.
In that case, there is no double taxation; instead, the
foreign country may just step into the vacuum and levy
its own tax on the return the United States refrains from
taxing. The net result is a transfer of revenue from the
United States to the foreign Treasury, which I am not sure
is what the supporters of the flat tax have in mind.
Weisbach is also correct in pointing out that if infra-
marginal returns can be earned only in the United States,
the investor is likely to earn them here even if they are
subject to full double taxation. It should be noted, how-
ever, that unless it has a monopoly, the foreign investor
may have to compete with U.S. investors that bear the
burden of U.S. taxation only on the same inframarginal
returns. It has recently been argued that that situation
could lead to the foreign investor being forced out of the
U.S. market.44
Where I disagree with Weisbach on this point is in his
assessment of the frequency with which foreign investors
are likely to earn inframarginal returns that are not
specific to the United States. There exists a huge literature
on why multinational enterprises exist, and most of it
suggests that they exist because they can earn inframar-
ginal returns by internalizing costs that would have to be
borne in arm’s-length transactions.45 Moreover, most of
these inframarginal returns are not specific to any coun-
try; they result from the multinational possessing, for
example, intangible assets that can be utilized in many
places. That is the key to the existence of tax competition
in which multinationals conduct an auction among sev-
eral countries that are otherwise equivalent to see which
one will grant them the biggest tax breaks. The whole
point of the competition is that the multinational can earn
inframarginal returns in more than one country.46 Thus, if
those returns are subject to double taxation in the United
States but to single or no taxation elsewhere, the multi-
national will not invest in the United States. Contrary to
Weisbach’s assessment, that is likely to be a frequent
occurrence.
Weisbach further argues that I am wrong in conclud-
ing that existing U.S. treaties would not apply to the flat
tax, because ‘‘income taxes are not defined in treaties.
While the flat tax would tax consumption, not income, it
is not labeled a consumption tax, which seems to be the
key factor.’’47 He points out that there were periods in
U.S. history in which accelerated depreciation led to the
effective rate on capital income being zero (for example,
1981-1982), and that other countries did not abrogate
their treaties.
While it is true that treaties were not abrogated in the
early 1980s, the Reagan administration did not label the
adoption of accelerated depreciation as fundamental tax
reform, and it retreated from the zero rate within one
41Id. at 642.
42David Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy (2004).
43Weisbach, ‘‘Ironing,’’ supra note 38 at 643.
44See Mihir Desai and James Hines, ‘‘Evaluating Interna-
tional Tax Reform,’’ 56 Nat’l Tax J. 487 (2003).
45See, e.g., Pitelis and Sugden, The Nature of the Transnational
Firm (1998), ch. 2.
46See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,’’ 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1573
(2000).
47Weisbach, ‘‘Ironing,’’ supra note 38 at 643.
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year because of its dire budgetary consequences. If the
flat tax were adopted, it would be intended as a perma-
nent measure, and everyone would be aware that the
United States has explicitly abandoned the income tax in
favor of a consumption tax. It seems highly unlikely that
this would not lead other countries to reconsider their
income tax treaties with the United States, especially if
(as argued above) the U.S. reform leads to a significant
capital outflow from those countries to the United States.
There are no tax treaties for VATs, and there is no reason
to maintain treaties for the flat tax, which is (as everyone,
including Weisbach, acknowledges) a form of VAT. More-
over, as Weisbach also acknowledges, countries would
have no reason to renegotiate their treaties because the
flat tax unilaterally abolishes our main negotiating lever-
age, the withholding tax.
Weisbach also argues that my prediction that the
United States would become a tax haven is ‘‘simply
incorrect’’ because ‘‘[t]he United States previously has
had a very low, even negative, tax on capital income, and
problems with foreign investors sheltering income in the
United States were not sufficient to cause serious inter-
national concerns.’’48 This ignores three facts: First, the
previous period of zero or negative rates on capital
income in the United States was very short (1981-1982).
Second, capital mobility now is much higher than it was
in the early 1980s. And finally, European economists have
documented that the Reagan tax cuts of 1981 did in fact
have very serious negative consequences for Europe and
the world economy, including rising European unem-
ployment and a sharp rise in the value of the dollar that
forced a concentrated intervention to bring it down in
1987.49 I believe those negative consequences would be
dwarfed if the United States were to permanently adopt
a zero tax on marginal returns to capital. It is hard to
imagine that any country could continue to tax capital
income, just like the unilateral abolition of withholding
on portfolio interest by the United States in 1984 forced
all other countries to do the same. Some, of course, would
welcome the end of the income tax, but I do not share
their enthusiasm, and neither do some other thoughtful
observers.50
Weisbach argues correctly that adoption of the flat tax
could lead to dramatic simplification of the international
tax rules, because both the antideferral and foreign tax
credit rules could be eliminated.51 The same degree of
simplification can be achieved by adopting a territorial
income tax, so this is not just a feature of the flat tax. The
price to be paid, however, is significantly increased
avoidance potential, as U.S. multinationals shift their
income overseas through transfer pricing and similar
planning techniques. Simplification, as many observers
have noted, is not the only criterion for a well functioning
tax system. Efficiency and equity are also relevant, and
both are decreased under a territorial system.
Weisbach concludes by stating that ‘‘[d]espite the
complexity of the economic issues, the design consider-
ations for international taxation under the flat tax are
mostly good news.’’52 For the reasons given above, I
respectfully disagree.
IV. Should the U.S. Reinvent the Wheel?
In this section, I will develop a proposal to adopt a
federal VAT in addition to the existing income tax. I will
first discuss some of the structural issues that need to be
addressed in designing a federal VAT. Next, I will ad-
dress the relationship of the proposed tax to state and
local RSTs. Finally, I will distinguish this proposal from
the proposal advanced by Michael Graetz to adopt a
federal VAT but exempt the first $100,000 of income from
the income tax.
A. A Federal VAT
In general, a VAT is superior to the income tax for
several reasons. First, it is much simpler to administer, as
evidenced by the ability of developing countries with
weak tax administrations to collect significant revenue
from it (while failing to collect the personal income tax).
Second, it is less subject to cyclical fluctuations in the
economy. Third, it is less subject to tax competition,
because consumers are less mobile than capital. Fourth, it
can reach sectors that are hard to tax otherwise (such as
the informal sector, the criminal sector, and the nonprofit
sector). Its main drawback is its regressivity, but that can
be addressed by using other, more progressive taxes to
tax the rich, and by using the revenues in progressive
fashion. Thus, it is not surprising that most countries in
the world use the VAT as their primary tax, and even in
OECD member countries it is approaching the income tax
in importance as the main source of government rev-
enues.53
Any VAT proposal has to address several issues: Will
it be a consumption or income VAT; will tax liability be
determined by the invoice-credit, subtraction, or addition
method; will the tax be destination- or origin-based; and
what exemptions will be allowed?54
1. Consumption vs. income VAT. A VAT can be either a
consumption- or an income-type VAT. A consumption-
type VAT allows for expensing of all business expendi-
tures, including the purchase of capital goods and inven-
tories. An income-type VAT, on the other hand, allows
only capital expenses to be depreciated, like the income
tax. In a consumption-type VAT, but not in the income-
type, the normal return to capital is exempt under the
Cary Brown theorem.
48Id. at 644.
49Hans Werner Sinn, ‘‘U.S. Tax Reform 1981 and 1986: Impact
on International Capital Markets and Capital Flows,’’ 41 Nat’l
Tax J. 327 (1988).
50See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the
Income Tax (2001).
51Weisbach, ‘‘Ironing,’’ supra note 38 at 644.
52Id. at 645.
53Countries with VAT use it to raise an average of 27 percent
of total revenues and 5 percent of gross domestic product. See
Ebrill et al., The Modern VAT, p. 8 (2001). In 2001 taxes on goods
and services accounted for 31.3 percent and corporate and
personal income taxes accounted for 36 percent of total revenue.
OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2002, Table 3 (2003).
54Some countries use multiple rates as well, but they are not
discussed in this article.
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Almost all countries follow a consumption-type VAT,
although some restrict the deductibility of large capital
expenditures for revenue reasons. The United States
should adopt a consumption-type VAT because it is
much simpler to administer than an income-type VAT. In
fact, one of the major simplification advantages of a
consumption tax is to get rid of accounting for basis for
both inventory and capital goods, which is the source of
significant complexity in the income tax. Moreover, the
concerns that arise because of the exemption of the
normal return to capital from tax, primarily in the
international context (described above), do not apply in
the context of this proposal because the corporate income
tax will be retained.
2. Invoice-credit, subtraction, or addition VAT. In theory,
a VAT can reach the same result either by using an
invoice-credit method, a subtraction method, or an addi-
tion method. Under the invoice-credit method (a tax
against a tax calculation), input credits are granted
against tax on taxable sales on showing an invoice
indicating that output tax has been paid. Under the
subtraction method, a business deducts its taxable pur-
chases from other registered firms from its taxable sales
to arrive at the tax base, to which the tax rate is applied.
Under the addition method, the various factors of pro-
duction (wages, rent, interest expense, and profit) are
added up as the tax base.
The vast majority of countries using the VAT use the
transaction-based invoice-credit method. Japan uses a
modified form of the subtraction method, but has re-
cently come to rely more on invoices to audit the tax.
Israel uses a form of the addition method for financial
institutions and insurance companies (and so do Michi-
gan and New Hampshire for all companies).
One could argue that using the subtraction method is
preferable for the United States because it is more famil-
iar and ‘‘feels’’ more like an income tax. It is based on
accounts for taxable periods, not on transactions, and
involves the subtraction of deductions from taxable sales
(and is thus much more vulnerable to base erosion). In
addition, it is less obviously competitive with the state
RST, and some commentators have expressed concern
about two taxes (the federal VAT and state RST) being
stated on the same invoice.
However, I believe that the better choice for the United
States would be to adopt an invoice-credit VAT like the
majority of other countries. First, because in my proposal
the income tax is retained, I think it is better to sharply
distinguish the VAT from the income tax by making it a
transparent transactional tax that is stated on invoices.
Otherwise, businesses are likely to face the confusing
burden of filing periodic returns for both income and
VAT liability with different sets of inclusions and deduc-
tions for each. Many of the design problems with some of
the current consumption tax proposals in the United
States (for example, the problems with WTO, discussed
above) result from the attempt to make them look more
like an income tax. If we adopt a consumption tax we
should be clear about what we are doing and distinguish
it as much as possible from the income tax.
Second, the invoice-credit VAT is difficult to evade,
because it most clearly invokes the interest of business
purchasers in ensuring that tax was paid by their suppli-
ers. That is why even Japan relies more on invoices than
it did previously.
Third, I do not think the concern about the state RST is
well taken. For reasons explained below, I think the
federal government should not accommodate the state
RST in any way, but should instead put pressure on the
states to adopt the VAT.
3. Destination or origin VAT. A VAT can be either
destination-based, that is, imposed on imports and zero
rated on exports, or origin-based, that is, with imports
deductible and exports includable. Economists have ar-
gued for a long time that border adjustability (that is, a
destination-based VAT) does not boost exports because
exchange rate adjustments would ensure that in the long
run the relative prices in the exporting and importing
country would be the same as before the imposition of
the tax. That is, even if country A uses the destination
principle and country B the origin principle, so that it
seems as if exports from A to B are not taxed at all and
from B to A double-taxed, the exchange rate would adjust
to eliminate country A’s apparent advantage.
There are some grounds to doubt whether that theo-
retical construct holds in the real world. Exchange rates
are notoriously imperfect, and may take a while to adjust.
In addition, while there is only one exchange rate,
imports and exports may have different balances in
different sectors of the economy. Thus, it is not surprising
that politicians are convinced that border adjustability
boosts exports, at least in the short run. Nevertheless,
under the WTO rules, the United States can adopt a
border-adjustable VAT, as long as it clearly qualifies as a
VAT, which an invoice-credit VAT of the type proposed
certainly does.
Moreover, the destination principle is far superior as
an administrative matter. It means that all countries in
the world use the same principle without the need for an
elaborate tax treaty network, as in the income tax. More-
over, the destination principle eliminates the need for
transfer pricing enforcement, which is a major issue in
the income tax and in origin-based VATs because imports
from related parties are deductible and exports to related
parties includable in the base.
Thus, I believe the United States should follow the rest
of the world and adopt a destination-based VAT. It also
makes sense to have a consumption tax apply when
goods are consumed and not where they are produced.
There is a temptation in destination-based VAT to travel
abroad to consume goods and services in low VAT
countries, but this ‘‘tourism problem’’ is hardly a suffi-
cient reason not to adopt the destination principle. More-
over, the United States does not have the problem of open
borders that the EU and the states face: If goods are
purchased in low VAT countries abroad and imported,
they can be taxed at the border at the higher domestic
VAT rate.
4. Exemptions. Most of the administrative problems
associated with VATs abroad result from exemptions.
Those fall into three broad categories: item exemptions
for some products, like food, clothing, or housing, to
alleviate regressivity; entity exemptions for small busi-
ness regardless of the kind of products sold, to lighten the
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administrative burden; and exemptions for sectors that
are hard to tax, like financial services.
In general, the fewer exemptions allowed, the better,
and we should follow the example of countries like New
Zealand and South Africa that have VATs with a very
broad base (even local government services are taxed in
New Zealand). Exemptions to alleviate regressivity are
misplaced because the VAT revenues can be used in
nonregressive ways. If necessary, a rebate check would
even be issued to low-income families, and that would be
easier if the income tax mechanism is left in place. That
would prevent the endless debate, familiar from the state
RST, about which items are and are not exempt.
A threshold for small business is also a bad idea,
because it inevitably leads to attempts to disaggregate
businesses to put each below the threshold, provides an
incentive to omit sales when approaching the threshold,
and is contrary to the experience of states in collecting
retail sales taxes from small firms. Instead, the federal
government should pay small businesses a small subsidy
to help cover the costs of compliance with the VAT, such
as printing tax invoices or purchasing automated cash
registers.
Finally, an exemption for the financial services indus-
try is the worst of all, because it leads to a cascading tax
in services rendered to business: If a bank is exempt, it
cannot get input credits for its own purchases, nor can
businesses that receive services from the bank get credits
for those taxes paid by the bank’s supplier. The reason
the financial services sector is exempt in some countries
(primarily in Europe) is because it was mistakenly be-
lieved that it would be impossible to unbundle fee-based
services (which should be taxable) from intermediation
services buried in interest rates (which should be exempt
until an administrable way is found to tax those services).
But South Africa has shown that bundling does not
happen in practice if interest rate competition is strong
enough, as is certainly the case in the United States. Thus,
both fee-based financial services and casualty and similar
insurance (other than life insurance) should be covered.
B. The State and Local Retail Sales Tax
Some of the complexity of consumption tax proposals
in the United States results from the attempt to accom-
modate the state and local RST. However, I believe that
the tax is hopelessly broken and should not be accom-
modated.
The state and local RST in the United States is an old
tax, adopted in the 1930s by most states to alleviate the
cyclicality of the income tax during the Depression. From
today’s perspective, it suffers from four major problems
that make it hopelessly obsolete.
First, the tax is overinclusive: A very large portion
(some estimates are as high as 40 percent) of the RST falls
on sales from business to business, because most RSTs
only contain exemptions for items that are themselves
resold or that are physically incorporated into items that
are resold. That means that the tax has a cascading effect
(the tax on the final retail sales falls in part on the tax on
a previous sale).
Second, the tax is underinclusive: Most services are
exempt from the tax. Attempts by Florida and Massachu-
setts to tax services failed as service businesses threat-
ened to move out of state. Other states tax some services,
but the list of which services are taxable is arbitrary and
varies greatly by state. Debates and litigation on classi-
fying items as goods or services abound.
Third, state taxes are extremely complex, and need-
lessly so. That is true of the taxes of individual states and
is especially true when the taxes of all states and localities
are considered together.
Fourth, because of that complexity the Supreme Court
decided in Quill that states cannot force vendors to collect
use tax on items sold via catalogue or e-commerce from
out-of-state locations, because to do so would impose an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. At-
tempts by the states to get Congress to accept their efforts
to harmonize the sales tax base and overrule Quill have
failed.
I believe the last problem offers an opportunity: When
adopting a VAT, Congress should overrule Quill (and the
moratorium on taxation of Internet services) for every
state and locality that adopts an identical VAT to the
federal one, with only the rate to be determined by the
state. Hopefully, the rise of e-commerce should prompt
most states to abandon their obsolete RSTs in favor of
VATs, which could even be collected by the federal
government as a ‘‘piggyback’’ on the federal tax (as is
done in several other federal countries).55
C. Conclusion: The Graetz Proposal
I am not the first to propose that the United States
adopt a destination-based, invoice-credit VAT in addition
to the income tax. That proposal has been made over a
decade ago, and elaborated more recently, by Prof.
Michael Graetz.56
However, there is a major difference between my
proposal and the Graetz proposal: Graetz proposes using
the revenue from the VAT to exempt any U.S. resident
with AGI of $100,000 or less from the income tax. Thus,
Graetz argues, we will eliminate ‘‘100 million unneces-
sary returns’’ and return the income tax to its pre-World
War II function of taxing the rich.
The Graetz proposal is sensible. As argued above, the
main function of the income tax is to tax the rich, so that
from this perspective it makes no sense to impose it on
middle-income and poor taxpayers. In addition, those
taxpayers consume most of their income, so that they can
be taxed with a VAT without the complexities of the
55See, e.g., the harmonized sales tax of the Canadian Atlantic
provinces. In general, there are many different models of
accommodating subnational VATs in a system that has a na-
tional VAT; Canada has six of them, Brazil yet another. The main
point here is that the national VAT should not attempt to
accommodate the state RST.
56See Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A
Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System,’’ 112 Yale L.J. 261 (2002). See
also Rep. Gibbons’s proposal (H.R. 4050, Revenue Restructuring
Act of 1996, 104th Cong. 2nd Sess.) to replace the corporate tax,
much of the individual tax (for incomes up to $75,000), and the
payroll taxes with a sales-subtraction VAT. See William H.
Morris, ‘‘A ‘National Debate’ on VAT: The Gibbons Proposal,’’
Tax Notes, Aug. 30, 1993, p. 1259.
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income tax. And to the extent they save, we should be
encouraging saving by the middle class, given our abys-
mal national savings rate.
However, I believe the Graetz proposal is the wrong
way to go, at least for now. First, Graetz exaggerates the
complexity of the income tax for middle-income taxpay-
ers. Many of them file Form 1040EZ, and take the
standard deduction. For those taxpayers, the income tax
is not complex at all. We should, however, consider
simplifying it further by adopting a pay-as-you-earn
(PAYE), return-less system based on employer withhold-
ing for taxpayers with only wage income, as is done by
many other countries.
Second, and more importantly, we cannot afford the
Graetz proposal at present, because it is designed to be
revenue-neutral. To finance the retirement and health
needs of the baby boom generation, not to speak about
other urgent needs like extending health insurance to all
Americans, we face a budgetary gap of $70 trillion
dollars. There is simply no way to raise that kind of
revenue with the existing income tax. Raising income tax
rates to the levels of the 1970s or earlier is counter-
productive because it imposes too high burdens on the
decision to work, and because it drives away investors in
the face of global tax competition. Thus, if we do not
want to unravel the social compact of the New Deal by
drastically cutting benefits, we need to adopt a VAT in
addition to the existing income tax.57
The adoption of a VAT on top of the income tax is
likely to be opposed by both conservatives and liberals.
Conservatives will argue that increasing the overall share
of the government in GDP from about 30 percent to about
40 percent, the average level in the OECD, will slow
economic growth. They may be right, but the level of
economic growth in other OECD member countries has
been acceptable, and in some cases (for example, Europe)
has been hindered by other factors we do not face, like
low labor mobility. I believe that a slightly lower growth
rate is an acceptable price to pay for ensuring a decent
retirement and healthcare package for the baby boom
generation.
Liberals are likely to oppose the VAT because it is
regressive. That is true, but as explained above, the
regressivity of the VAT can be offset by using the revenue
in progressive ways. Both Social Security and Medicare
are progressive, and if needed, some of the revenue can
be rebated to lower-income families to ensure further
progressivity.
In 2003 the United States joined most of the OECD in
enacting a form of corporate-shareholder income tax
integration. While I have misgivings about that reform, it
was a step to eliminate one of the basic ways in which our
tax structure differed from that of other OECD member
countries. The time has come to eliminate the other, more
glaring abnormality of our tax system by adopting a VAT
in addition to the existing income tax. The political
prospects for this reform may be dim at present; but
every year that brings the baby boomers closer to retire-
ment will make those prospects brighter.
57We could, of course, raise the payroll tax instead, but this
seems highly unlikely to be politically acceptable.
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